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Suppose a police officer conducts a warrantless search of a per-
son's home during which the officer causes the person harm. By vir-
tue of 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 the injured person may have a federal cause
of action against the police officer personally2 for damages resulting
from the alleged violation of the plaintiff's Fourth (and Fourteenth 3)
Amendment rights. From a corrective justice perspective, 4 the police
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Tech-
nology. B.A., University of Chicago; J.D. and LL.M, Harvard Law School; Master in Religious
Studies, University of Chicago Divinity School. I want to thank Susan Bandes for her very
helpful comments on a draft of this Essay.
1. Section 1983, which in effect creates a Fourteenth Amendment action for damages,
reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial of-
ficer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief
shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.
42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (1996).
Section 1983 is the subject of my two-volume treatise, with annual cumulative supplement.
See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SEC-
TION 1983 (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1996) [hereinafter CIVIL RioHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES]. See
also SHELDON NAHMOD, MICHAEL WELLS & THOMAS EATON, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS (1995).
2. The potential damages liability of an individual defendant personally may be quite ex-
tensive. It can include not only significant compensatory damages but, where the defendant acts
with reckless disregard of constitutional rights, she can be liable for punitive damages as well.
See CIVIL RIOHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 1, §§ 4.01-4.15. In contrast, while local gov-
ernments can be liable for compensatory damages under § 1983, they are absolutely immune
from punitive damages. See id. §§ 6.01-6.24.
The seriousness of the potential individual damages liability of § 1983 defendants is directly
relevant to the extent to which empathy and mercy for such defendants may be present. See
discussion infra pp. 823-29.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates most of the Bill of Rights, including the
Fourth Amendment, and applies them to the states. See CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES,
supra note 1, § 2.03. The relevant Fourth Amendment cases are Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961) and Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
4. Corrective justice has both Aristotelian and Kantian elements. See Sheldon Nahmod,
Constitutional Damages and Corrective Justice: A Different View, 76 VA. L. REV. 997, 1001 (1990)
(discussing Aristotelian elements); Ernest J. Weinrib, Essay: The Gains and Losses of Corrective
Justice, 44 DUKE L.J. 277, 289-93 (1994) (discussing the connection between Kantianism and
corrective justice).
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officer must compensate the plaintiff because the officer's normatively
improper conduct violated the applicable Fourth Amendment stan-
dard and caused the plaintiff harm.
But there is considerably more to this § 1983 story. Even if the
police officer in fact violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights,
she may not be liable for damages due to the affirmative defense of
qualified immunity.5 Under current standards, if the officer can show
that a reasonable police officer under the same circumstances could
have believed that the warrantless search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment at the time of the search, 6 then she avoids damages
liability.
One can explain this objective reasonableness qualified immunity
test either in corrective justice terms or in utilitarian terms.7 A correc-
tive justice explanation is that although the police officer violated the
Fourth Amendment, she acted reasonably, and thus her fault, as a
normative matter, did not warrant the imposition of damages. A utili-
tarian explanation is that although the police officer was indeed at
fault for violating a constitutional norm, society needs to promote in-
dependent decision-making by providing a margin for error for gov-
ernment officials and employees. Thus, the plaintiff bears his own loss
for the greater benefit of the public.
8
Whatever the explanation, in the real world of § 1983 litigation
qualified immunity has become a remarkably potent defense for de-
fendants. This is not only the result of pro-defendant doctrinal
changes in the elements of the qualified immunity test, but also be-
cause the procedural ground rules have been changed for the benefit
5. See CIVIL RiGHrS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 1, §§ 8.01-8.21, for an extensive
discussion. Relevant aspects of qualified immunity are addressed in this Essay.
6. This temporal emphasis is important. Whether the Fourth Amendment was violated is
determined using current Fourth Amendment standards, even if the challenged conduct oc-
curred in the past, and even if the case is one of first impression. In contrast, whether the quali-
fied immunity objective reasonableness test was passed is determined using then-current Fourth
Amendment standards. For example, assume in the hypothetical that the challenged conduct
occurred in January 1992. When the court decides in 1995 whether the challenged conduct vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment, it uses 1995 Fourth Amendment standards. In contrast, when it
determines whether the defendant police officer acted in an objectively reasonable manner for
qualified immunity purposes, it uses January 1992 Fourth Amendment standards.
7. Compare John C. Jeffries, Jr., Damages for Constitutional Violations: The Relation of
Risk to Injury in Constitutional Torts, 75 VA. L. REV. 1461, 1468-70 (1989) (arguing for the
corrective justice explanation of qualified immunity), with Nahmod, supra note 4, at 1002-06,
1019 (arguing for the utilitarian explanation of qualified immunity).
8. "[W]here an official's duties legitimately require action in which clearly established
rights are not implicated, the public interest may be better served by action taken 'with indepen-
dence and without fear of consequences."' Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 821 (1982) (quot-
ing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
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of § 1983 defendants. However, I want to argue that much more has
changed than the applicable doctrines themselves: the shift is deeper
than that. As a structural matter, these changes in the substantive and
procedural doctrines privilege the § 1983 defendant's narrative and
marginalize the counter-narrative of the plaintiff, thereby directing
the qualified immunity decision-maker-the judge-to empathize 9
more with the defendant than with the injured plaintiff. This empathy
may in turn tend to encourage the judge, at least in close cases, to act
mercifully and alleviate the defendant's potential damages liability to
the plaintiff. 10
This Essay describes and analyzes structurally each of the rele-
vant substantive and procedural changes, showing how each promotes
a pro-defendant posture of empathy and mercy. If I am correct, this
posture is ironic in several respects. First, the U.S. Supreme Court has
frequently warned in other contexts that emotions such as mercy,
compassion, and pity are inappropriate grounds for decision." Sec-
ond, this posture turns on its head the current academic insistence on
hearing the "outsider's" narrative: it focuses instead on the "insider's"
9. By empathy I mean "understanding the experience or situation of another, both affec-
tively and cognitively, often achieved by imagining oneself to be in the position of the other
.... " Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 Mici. L. REV. 1574, 1579 (1987). Com-
pare Lauren Wispe's psychotherapeutic definition: "'Empathy' refers to the attempt by one self-
aware self to comprehend unjudgmentally the positive and negative experiences of another
self.... Empathy depends upon the use of imaginal and mimitic [sic] capabilities and it is most
often an effortful process." Nancy Eisenberg & Janey Strayer, Critical Issues in the Study of
Empathy, in EMPATHY AND rrs DEVELOPMENT 4 (Nancy Eisenberg & Janey Strayer eds., 1987).
As this Essay makes clear, I agree with Susan Bandes when she writes: "Empathy, by itself,
is merely an instrumental concept. It is not an emotion, benign or otherwise, but rather a capac-
ity, a tool used to achieve a variety of ends." Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim
Impact Statements, 63 U. Cm. L. REV. 361, 379 (1996). In the present § 1983 context, the
Supreme Court has structured empathy in such a way that it favors the defendant and thereby
promotes the Court's substantive goals.
10. The desire of the judge to alleviate the § 1983 defendant's potential liability can be
characterized as merciful if the defendant is considered to have acted wrongfully in violating the
constitutional norm. Note that there is a thin line between compassion and mercy regarding
blame and punishment. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Equity and Mercy, 22 PIL. & PuB. AFF. 83,
83, 109 n.50 (1993).
11. For example, the Court characterized compassion as irrelevant to the due process merits
in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). In Deshaney, the
Court ruled against a child who sued social service officials for damages under § 1983, because
they returned him to the custody of his natural father, despite clear prior indications of serious
child abuse, who subsequently beat him into a vegetative state. See id.; Benjamin Zipursky,
Note, DeShaney and the Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101 (1990) (criticiz-
ing DeShaney). And in Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 486 (1990), the Court held that an anti-
sympathy instruction in the penalty phase of a criminal defendant's trial did not violate the
Eighth Amendment. But cf. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 811, 830 (1991) (upholding the




narrative, namely that of the government official.12 And finally, one
government official's qualified immunity determination-the judge-
is now so structured that in close cases qualified immunity promotes a
posture of empathy and mercy for another government official, the
§ 1983 defendant. Indeed, § 1983 immunity doctrine as a whole ap-
pears to be grounded, at least in part, on the empathy that judges feel
for governmental employees who may be inconvenienced and stigma-
tized by discovery or trial.' 3
This Essay builds on the work of others regarding narrative and
empathy, and is grounded on the well-established "evaluative" con-
ception of the emotions rather than the now largely discredited
"mechanistic" conception. 14 However, it applies notions of narrative
and empathy to § 1983, an area far-removed from the criminal law
setting where so much of this kind of analysis occurs.
THE PRIOR Two-PART QUALIFIED IMMUNrrY TEST AND
NARRATIVE/EMPATHY PARITY
A short time ago, the qualified immunity test was not exclusively
objective, but had a subjective component as well. In Pierson v. Ray,' 5
decided in 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court held that police officers have
an affirmative defense of good faith and probable cause to claims of
unconstitutional arrests. The plaintiffs there, peaceful sit-in demon-
strators, asserted that they had been arrested, first, under a breach of
the peace statute subsequently held unconstitutional and, second,
under circumstances clearly indicating the absence of any factual basis
for their arrest.
The Court noted as to the first claim:
Under the prevailing view in this country a peace officer who arrests
someone with probable cause is not liable for false arrest simply
because the innocence of the suspect is later proved. A policeman's
lot is not so unhappy that he must choose between being charged
with dereliction of duty if he does not arrest when he has probable
cause, and being mulcted in damages if he does. Although the mat-
ter is not entirely free from doubt, the same consideration would
12. As noted later, though, the counter-narrative of the plaintiff-often an outsider-is
marginalized.
13. This applies not just to qualified immunity but particularly to the absolute immunity
from damages liability of judges themselves. See infra note 29.
14. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 301 (1996). See also Bandes, supra note 9, at 366 ("[T]here is
broad agreement on one crucial point-that emotions have a cognitive aspect-and its corol-
lary-that reasoning has an emotive aspect.").
15. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
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seem to require excusing him from liability for acting under a stat-
ute that he reasonably believed to be valid but that was later held
unconstitutional, on its face or as applied.
16
The Court then applied Monroe v. Pape's17 "background of tort
liability" approach, described as including the defense of good faith
and probable cause, to the police officers and concluded: "We agree
that a police officer is not charged with predicting the future course of
constitutional law.' 8 The Court thus suggested that if the reasonable-
ness of the defendants' conduct in connection with the legal status of
the statute had been the only issue before it, it would have ruled as a
matter of law that the defendants acted reasonably.
However, the Court held as to the second claim that it was for the
jury to determine whether the police officers "reasonably believed in
good faith that the arrest was constitutional. . ... ,19 If the jury be-
lieved the officers' testimony, then the officers would prevail; if it be-
lieved the testimony of the plaintiffs and other witnesses, the plaintiffs
would prevail.20
In discussing the defense of good faith and probable cause, the
Court in Pierson clearly indicated that police officers have the burden
of proving this reasonable grounds/good faith defense.21 Further,
while Pierson may be criticized for its rather conclusory assertion that
such a common law tort defense ought to be fully applicable to police
officers in § 1983 cases, Pierson reflects the Court's concern that a
margin for error be given to police officers to allow them to perform
effectively. 22
Observe that under the two-part Pierson test, the police officer in
the initial hypothetical loses and thus is liable in damages unless she
prevails on both parts. Even if she acted reasonably, she is still liable
if she subjectively knew that the warrantless search was unconstitu-
tional when it took place, admittedly not a very likely scenario,
16. Id. at 555 (citations omitted).
17. 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling Monroe's holding that cities were not persons subject to § 1983
liability).
18. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557.
19. Id.
20. See id.
21. I later refer to this defense of reasonable grounds and good cause as the "Pierson two-
part test." For further discussion of who should have this burden see CIVIL RIorrs AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES, supra note 1, § 8.19.
22. Consider also the fact that the police officer's employer, a city or county, is not vicari-
ously liable for damages under § 1983. See CIVIL RIGrrs AND CIVIL LIBERTIs, supra note 1,
§§ 6.01-6.24 (on local government liability). Furthermore, the judge who may be involved is
absolutely immune. See id. 88 7.01-7.16. Thus, the police officer is frequently the sole target.
1997]
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although a possible one. Conversely, an honest but unreasonable be-
lief in constitutionality similarly would not avoid damages liability.
But if she had both an honest and a reasonable belief in the constitu-
tionality of her conduct at the time it took place, then she would es-
cape damages liability altogether even though she may have violated
the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.
It is significant that under this two-part test there was typically a
parity of narrative, or a kind of symmetry, for both the plaintiff and
defendant. Each had the chance to tell his or her story in full to the
decision-maker and to present both a narrative and counter-narrative,
without being treated as faceless. That is, each party had a meaningful
opportunity through narrative to have the decision-maker put itself
into that party's place, to "'judge with' the agent who has done the
alleged wrong"23 as well as the person who was harmed. Thus, the
decision-maker could empathize with, and possibly have mercy for,
the defendant,24 and empathize with, and perhaps pity, the innocent
plaintiff. This parity of narrative functioned in a very real sense to
promote Aristotelian "equity" because it focused on the particulari-
ties of the case itself in all of its aspects, including the actual state of
mind of the constitutional tort defendant and the circumstances of
both of the parties.25
Equally significant, in most cases-as in Pierson itself-the ulti-
mate decision-maker was the jury because of the existence of the sub-
jective part of qualified immunity. It worked this way: where the
§ 1983 defendant moved for summary judgment based on qualified
23. Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 94.
24. The connection among narrative, empathy, and mercy is a deep one.
The person who "reads" a complex case in the manner of the reader of a narrative or
the spectator at a drama is put in contact-by the structure of the forms themselves as
they solicit the reader's or spectator's attention-with two features of the equitable: its
attentiveness to particularity and its capacity for sympathetic understanding. This
means that the spectator or reader, if he or she reads well, is already prepared for
equity and, in turn, for mercy.
See id. at 105. See generally Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. Rv. 971
(1991); Bandes, supra note 9; Robert Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4
(1983).
25. Also, where the particular constitutional standard itself was somewhat rigid, the two-
part qualified immunity test alleviated some of its harshness and did "justice" when it was prop-
erly applied and "use[d] equity's flexible standard." Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 96. In the
Fourth Amendment situation, the constitutional standard is objective in not taking account of
the police officer's actual state of mind but it is particularistic in taking account of the actual
circumstances. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 (1996). Other constitutional
standards do both: for example, both the Eighth Amendment, which requires deliberate indiffer-
ence, and the Equal Protection Clause, which requires purposeful discrimination, have state of
mind requirements. See Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) (deliberate indifference re-
quirement); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (purposeful discrimination requirement).
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immunity, that motion frequently would be denied because of the
existence of a material issue of fact in dispute regarding the defend-
ant's actual state of mind.26 Consequently, it was the jury that would
go on to hear the plaintiff's detailed version of what happened as well
as the defendant's. The jury, considered to be the representative of
the community, applied a "common-sense judgment" in contrast to
"the more tutored.., reaction of the single judge . "... 27 In effect, it
was as if the community itself was evaluating the contrasting narra-
tives of the parties. Such an evaluation of both narratives by the jury,
following judicial instructions, would tend to be more evenhanded 28
than that of the judge. Alone, the judge, a government official like the
defendant and therefore perhaps more sensitive to the need for in-
dependent official conduct, might be more inclined to empathize with
the defendant.
29
26. See FED. R. Crv. P. 56.
27. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,156 (1968). Duncan was a criminal case in which the
Court went on to say: "[T]he jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a
fundamental decision about the exercise of official power-a reluctance to entrust plenary pow-
ers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of judges."
More to the present point, see United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
where the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's rejection of a jury nullification instruction in
a criminal trespass case involving a protest against Dow Chemical Company. In the course of its
opinion, the court observed that the famous University of Chicago study of the American crimi-
nal jury system supported
the conclusion that the jury is likely to call on its prerogative of lenity and equity,
contrary to the judge's instruction, when the case is one where it can empathize with the
[criminal] defendant, feeling either that the jurors might well have been or come to be in
the same position, or that in the large the defendant's conduct is not so contrary to
general conduct standards as to be condemned as criminally deviate conduct.
Id. at 1130-31 n.33 (emphasis added).
28. It might be thought that the jury would tend to be pro-plaintiff rather than evenhanded
because it would empathize more with the injured plaintiff. This is because the plaintiff is usu-
ally an ordinary citizen like the jurors themselves. Still, at least until the Rodney King videotape
and trials, the conventional wisdom among civil rights plaintiffs' attorneys was that juries all too
often believed the narratives of § 1983 defendants as against those of plaintiffs because of the
defendants' positions of authority and respectability. At the same time, especially in police bru-
tality cases or warrantless search cases like the hypothetical, the plaintiffs tended to be minorities
or other "unpopular" persons. These factors frequently made it difficult for plaintiffs to recover
damages even under the prior two-part Pierson test.
29. It is surely no accident that the U.S. Supreme Court, itself a judicial body, held that
state and local judges are absolutely, and not just qualifiedly, immune from damages liability.
See CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 1, §§ 7.01-7.16. Absolute immunity means
that the defendant avoids not only potential liability but also the need to defend at all, and is
based on the importance of independent judicial decision-making. Still, it was not difficult for
the Court to put itself in the place of state and local government judges who would otherwise
have faced the threat of § 1983 suits whenever litigants appearing before them lost.
19971
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OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS: THE PRIORITY OF THE
DEFENDANT'S NARRATIVE
Parity of narrative, or symmetry, disappeared suddenly in Harlow
v. Fitzgerald.30 Harlow substantially modified the two-part qualified
immunity test by eliminating the subjective part, and by insisting that
the objective part of the test-now the primary part-be applied by
courts in a pro-defendant manner.31 The Court's avowed purpose was
to permit the defeat of insubstantial claims without resort to trial.
32
Harlow involved actions for damages against White House aides
to former President Nixon based in part on the First Amendment.3
3
In the course of ruling that these aides were protected only by quali-
fied (and not absolute) immunity, the Court went on to eliminate the
subjective part of the test.34 It first observed that an official's subjec-
tive good faith typically had been considered a disputed question of
fact which should not be decided on motion for summary judgment.
35
As a result, "substantial costs attend the litigation of the subjective
good faith of government officials . . . ," including extensive judicial
inquiries into subjective motivation which can be "peculiarly disrup-
tive of effective government. ' 36 It then declared:
[W]e conclude today that bare allegations of malice should not suf-
fice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to
the burdens of broad-reaching discovery. We therefore hold that
government officials performing discretionary functions, generally
are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.
37
By defining the limits of qualified immunity essentially in objective
terms, we provide no license to lawless conduct. The public interest
in deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims
remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal rea-
30. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
31. See id. at 818-19. Also indicating that the objective part was to be applied in a pro-
defendant manner were Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), discussed later, Davis v.
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984), and Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978). See CIVIL RIGHTS
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 1, at 104.
32. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.
33. Such a First Amendment action for damages is a constitutional tort action against fed-
eral officials based on the constitutional provision itself-a so-called Bivens action-without re-
sort to a statute like § 1983 that applies by its terms only to state and local government officials,
not federal officials. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
34. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 816-17.
37. Id. at 817-18 (emphasis added).
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sonableness of an official's acts. Where an official could be ex-
pected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or
constitutional rights, he should be made to hesitate; and a person
who suffers injury caused by such conduct may have a cause of ac-
tion. But where an official's duties legitimately require action in
which clearly established rights are not implicated, the public inter-
est may be better served by action taken "with independence and
without fear of consequences.
38
Harlow's elimination of the subjective part of the qualified immu-
nity test was expressly designed to minimize, if not altogether bypass,
the role of the jury in the qualified immunity determination. Hence-
forth, whether a defendant passed the qualified immunity test (and
would thus not be subject to damages liability personally) would de-
pend on whether she acted with an objectively reasonable belief in the
constitutionality of her conduct and nothing more.
This reconstituted objective reasonableness qualified immunity
test appears at first blush to raise a purely legal issue, and thus to be
peculiarly appropriate for the judge and not the jury. Narrative may
appear normatively inappropriate because empathy and mercy should
not interfere with a purely legal determination. However, the objec-
tive reasonableness inquiry is not solely a legal one: it is a law applica-
tion question, or a mixed question of law and fact.39 This was made
especially clear shortly after Harlow by Anderson v. Creighton.40
In Anderson, the defendant FBI officer and other law enforce-
ment officers conducted a warrantless search of the plaintiffs' home
because they erroneously believed that a suspected bank robber might
be found there.41 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held
that the defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on qualified
immunity grounds because the constitutional right allegedly violated
by the defendant-"the right of persons to be protected from warrant-
less searches of their home unless the searching officers have probable
cause and there are exigent circumstances-was clearly established"
at the time of the search.42
Reversing in an opinion by Justice Scalia, the U.S. Supreme
Court observed that the Eighth Circuit inquired into the existence of
clearly settled law at too high a level of generality.43 Under the
38. Id. at 818-19 (citations omitted). The Court rather clearly indicated that its discussion of
qualified immunity encompassed § 1983 actions. See id. n.30.
39. See infra note 48-discussing Hunter v. Bryant, 112 S. Ct. 534 (1991).
40. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
41. See id at 637.
42. Id. at 637-38.
43. See id. at 646.
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Eighth Circuit's approach, the Court contended, qualified immunity
could be converted into "a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply
by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.""4 Rather, the
proper approach was to ask whether the right allegedly violated was
clearly settled in a more particularized and fact-specific sense.4 5 Thus,
in the case before it, the relevant question was "the objective (albeit
fact-specific) question whether a reasonable officer could have be-
lieved [defendant's] warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly
established law and the information the searching officers possessed.
[Defendant's] subjective beliefs about the search are irrelevant. '46
This approach, the Court insisted, was not an expansion of the scope
of Harlow.
The determination of whether the defendant violated clearly set-
tled law in a particular case will therefore typically be a fact-specific
one, a factor that enhances the force of the defendant's narrative. The
fact-specific nature of this narrative introduces some complexity into
Harlow summary judgment procedure and its relation to discovery. It
suggests that limited discovery may occasionally be required prior to a
ruling on summary judgment. Thus, in Anderson, the Court com-
mented that, on remand, the district court should first decide whether
the actions alleged by the defendants were actions
that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful. If they are,
then [defendant] is entitled to dismissal prior to discovery. If they
are not, and if the actions [defendant] claims he took are different
from those the [plaintiffs] allege (and are actions that a reasonable
officer could have believed lawful), then discovery may be necessary
before [defendant's] motion for summary judgment on qualified im-
munity grounds can be resolved. Of course, any such discovery
should be tailored specifically to the question of [defendant's] quali-
fied immunity.47
The Harlow/Anderson test thus expressly requires the judge to
put himself or herself in the place of the § 1983 defendant before (or
while) making this law-application objective reasonableness determi-
nation.48 The judge does this by reading the defendant's particularized
narrative and imagining what it was like when she acted as she did
44. Id. at 639.
45. See id. at 640.
46. Id. at 641.
47. Id. at 646-47 n.6.
48. As further confirmation of the point that the Harlow/Anderson test calls for a law-appli-
cation judgment by the judge and not the jury, consider Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224 (1991), a
per curiam opinion, where the Supreme Court, reversing the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, summarily held that Secret Service officers sued for damages in connection with a
Fourth Amendment claim that they arrested the plaintiff without probable cause were protected
[Vol. 72:819
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under the circumstances confronting her.4 9 Such narratives, now man-
dated by Harlow/Anderson and the fact-specific gloss on the objective
reasonableness qualified immunity test, encourage empathy and
mercy for the § 1983 tort defendant in connection with the potential
for significant personal damages liability.
By way of example, consider the likely effect of a defendant-em-
pathic and fact-specific narrative in Rich v. City of Mayfield Heights.50
Here the plaintiff arrestee asserted a due process violation in the fail-
ure of the defendant police officers to immediately take him down
when they discovered him hanging in his cell.51 Instead, they called
paramedics, who took at least several minutes to arrive.5 2 This failure
allegedly caused the plaintiff permanent physical harm and institution-
alization, although he did not die.53 Ruling for the defendants, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit commented that it was clearly
settled in May 1987 that an arrestee had a due process right to ade-
quate medical care, even if his injuries were self-inflicted.54 However,
the inquiry here was more particularized and for that reason the de-
fendants were entitled to qualified immunity: "No case has been
brought to this Court's attention which recognizes a constitutional
duty on the part of jail officials to immediately cut down a prisoner
found hanging in his or her cell."' 55 What was constitutionally re-
quired was the prompt summoning of medical care, and that was
done.56
by qualified immunity. The plaintiff had been arrested for threatening the President in violation
of federal law. See id.
The Court ruled that the court of appeals had used an incorrect qualified immunity standard
when it stated that "whether a reasonable officer could have believed he had probable cause is a
question for the trier of fact, and summary judgment . . based on lack of probable cause is
proper only if there is one reasonable conclusion a jury could reach." Id. at 228. This was erro-
neous because the qualified immunity question was not for the jury but should be decided by the
court long before trial. See id. It was further incorrect because the proper qualified immunity
question was whether the defendants acted reasonably under settled law under the circum-
stances, and not whether another reasonable interpretation of what happened could be devel-
oped long afterwards. See id. The Supreme Court then concluded that the defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity because they had acted reasonably, even if mistakenly, under
settled law. See id.
49. Compare the judicious spectator in ADAM SMrTH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS
(1976).
50. 955 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir. 1992).
51. See id. at 1094.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 1096.




A second and perhaps more vivid example is O'Brien v. City of
Grand Rapids.57 Here is a factually accurate newspaper account of
what happened in O'Brien:
As Grand Rapids police with automatic rifles, tear-gas canisters
and stun grenades surrounded Joseph O'Brien's home in October
1987, O'Brien smoked cigarettes and ate lunch.... O'Brien, 33,
who was shot and partially paralyzed during the stand-off, is suing
the city of Grand Rapids, Police Chief William Hegarty and two
police officers for $5 million, claiming that they violated his consti-
tutional rights. Attorney Fred Dilley, in his opening statement
before a six-member jury, described his client as a "hermit" and
paranoid schizophrenic who was oblivious to the commotion
outside his home . . ., until officers started breaking his windows.
Even then, O'Brien thought his "house was being invaded by in-
truders,... His mind was not capable of registering that these were
police .... " O'Brien fired the first of his nine or 10 [sic] shots, none
of which resulted in injuries, after the windows were broken. The
nine-hour stand-off ended when officer Stanley Lis shot O'Brien in
the neck [severing his spinal cord and rendering him a paraplegic].
The stand-off began when a court officer, accompanied by Grand
Rapids police officer Dennis Johnson, tried to seize O'Brien's
pickup truck to help satisfy a $35,000 legal [default] judgment.
58
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
O'Brien reversed the district court on the Fourth Amendment quali-
fied immunity issue and declared:
We think it is clear that the officers were not, in law, excused on
exigent circumstances grounds from obtaining a warrant before in-
vading O'Brien's house. But we cannot say that no reasonable of-
ficer, objectively assessing the situation, could conclude that there
were exigent circumstances excusing the requirement that a warrant
be obtained. [Defendants] Hegarty and Ostapowicz are not held to
the standards of a constitutional law scholar concerning the vagaries
of the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement
of Fourth Amendment law. They were policemen, command of-
ficers to be sure, dealing with a potentially dangerous incident in the
middle of a residential neighborhood, that might have exploded at
any moment.5 9
Judge Keith soundly dissented in O'Brien, characterizing the de-
fendants' conduct as "unacceptable and outrageous." 6 In Judge
Keith's view, they should have recognized that, because the plaintiff
presented no threat and there was "no probable cause to believe he
57. 23 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 1994).
58. Ken Kolker, THE GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, O'Brien Home 'Invaded' by Police, Defense
Claims, January 24, 1992. The facts set out in this newspaper account were, so far as I can
discern, not disputed at trial.
59. O'Brien, 23 F.3d at 1000.
60. See id. at 1005-06.
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had committed any crime," it was objectively unreasonable to sur-
round plaintiff's home, break its windows and harass and persecute
him. 61 "[Their] refusal to obtain a warrant from a neutral and de-
tached magistrate, despite the passing of several hours, resembles the
self-righteous arrogance of a lynch mob. Unfortunately... [defend-
ants'] aggressive conduct incited a scenario which left [plaintiff]
paralyzed. "62
OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS: THE MARGINALIZATION OF THE
PLAINTIFF'S COUNTER-NARRATIVE OR, "WHEN Is IT
My TURN?"
It is not simply that the defendant in the hypothetical, like § 1983
defendants generally, is allowed a particularized narrative with the
consequent judicial empathy and mercy for her: the plaintiff is simul-
taneously denied his narrative. The parity of narrative present under
the prior two-part qualified immunity test is gone. This is the result of
the Court's instruction to trial courts in Harlow/Anderson that, to the
extent possible, they decide qualified immunity before the merits of
the § 1983 claims of plaintiffs are addressed. This is accomplished
procedurally through the device of a judge's assuming arguendo that
the defendant did indeed violate the plaintiff's constitutional rights
and then going on to address the qualified immunity question of ob-
jective reasonableness. The Court's approach permits a judge to rule
for a § 1983 defendant without ever reaching the merits of the plain-
tiff's claim. All that the judge does is assume a constitutional viola-
tion. Where the trial court has so ruled in favor of the defendant, the
perverse result is that a determination of clearly settled law has been
deferred.63
As a practical matter, then, the plaintiff's story is typically nar-
rated in a barebones fashion, especially since federal courts, where
most (although not all) constitutional tort actions are filed, are notice
pleading, not fact pleading, jurisdictions.64 And it is this barely told
61. Id. at 1006.
62. Id.
63. However, there may be times when the judge rules for the defendant on qualified im-
munity grounds because the judge determines that the plaintiff has not even stated a constitu-
tional tort action at all. See, e.g., Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233 (1991).
64. See Herbert A. Eastman, Speaking Truth to Power: The Language of Civil Rights Liti-
gators, 104 YALE L-. 763 (1995), who argues that civil rights complaints all too often contain
impoverished language that does not begin to do justice to plaintiffs' narratives. He then goes on
to suggest ways in which lawyers can and should draft civil rights complaints more "thickly" and
the benefits of so doing.
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story, not fleshed out, that competes with the defendant's more elabo-
rate and evidentiary narrative articulated in the qualified immunity
setting. Indeed, the plaintiff is not even permitted to make his story
richer and more detailed through discovery. As noted earlier, the
Supreme Court in Anderson emphasized that before a defendant's
qualified immunity motion for summary judgment is decided, no dis-
covery is permitted except insofar as it is related to the defendant's
entitlement to qualified immunity.65 This effectively prevents the
plaintiff from obtaining discovery with regard to his entire case as well
as presenting his narrative to the judge. At most the plaintiff can at-
tempt to rebut the defendant's qualified immunity narrative.
INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW
Under the prior two-part qualified immunity test, and in virtually
all federal trial settings, after a defendant who has moved for sum-
mary judgment loses that motion, the plaintiff's case proceeds to trial.
The defendant then has the opportunity to rebut the plaintiff's case
and to submit whatever affirmative defenses she wishes. Thus, both
parties in this situation will, at this point, have parity of narrative, that
is, the same chance to address the decision-maker, often the jury, and
to present their own narratives and counter-narratives. The case then
goes to the jury with the appropriate jury instructions, and it is only
after the jury reaches a verdict (and after post-trial motions are dealt
with) that the losing party has the opportunity to appeal. This is the
final judgment rule, which requires a final judgment at the trial level
before an appeal is permitted.
Strikingly, in Mitchell v. Forsyth66 the Court eliminated even this
opportunity for a § 1983 plaintiff to narrate his story to the jury. In-
stead, it effectively provided the defendant with two chances while
giving the plaintiff none. In Mitchell, a former United States attorney
general was sued for damages for the warrantless and thus allegedly
unconstitutional electronic surveillance of the plaintiff.67 Upon the
defendant's attempt to seek interlocutory review from the district
court's denial of his claims of qualified immunity, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit ruled that the qualified immunity issue was
not properly before it.68 Even though Harlow eliminated the subjec-
tive part of the qualified immunity test so as to encourage "the sum-
65. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646-47 n.6 (1987).
66. 472 U.S. 511 (1985).
67. See id. at 513.
68. See id.
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mary disposition of insubstantial claims brought against government
officials," it did not "relax . . . the rule[ ] limiting interlocutory
appeals.
69
In an opinion by Justice White, the U.S. Supreme Court declared
that the denial of a defense motion claiming absolute immunity was
appealable before final judgment under the collateral order doctrine
of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. ,70 because the claimant
might be entitled not to stand trial at all. Similarly, a defendant claim-
ing qualified immunity on clearly settled law grounds after Harlow was
also possibly entitled not to stand trial. Thus, under the collateral or-
der doctrine, a defendant claiming the absence of clearly settled law in
a qualified immunity/summary judgment motion could, where the mo-
tion was denied, appeal the denial.71
After Mitchell, when a trial court denies a defendant's qualified
immunity summary judgment motion the defendant can immediately
present her narrative to, and secure a chance to be heard by, an appel-
late judicial decision-maker. And like the trial court, the appellate
decision-maker is required to apply the objective reasonableness test
empathically from the defendant's perspective. 72 Here, too, the de-
fendant is the only party with a meaningful opportunity to narrate her
story in any detail. In short, under Harlow/Anderson and Mitchell, the
§ 1983 defendant secures two chances at narration and empathy
before the plaintiff gets even one.
69. 729 F.2d 267, 273 (1984).
70. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524-25 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indust. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 546 (1949)).
71. The Court in Mitchell, reaching the merits of the qualified immunity issue, ruled for the
defendant on the ground that it was not clearly established in 1970, the time when the defendant
approved the warrantless surveillance, that such surveillance was unconstitutional. See id. Only
after the warrantless surveillance did the Court decide United States v. United States District
Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972), holding that the Fourth Amendment did not permit the use
of warrantless wiretaps in cases involving domestic threats to the national security. Before that
time, the question was explicitly described as "open" by the Court. The defendant's motion in
Mitchell for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds should have been granted inas-
much as the defendant did not violate clearly settled law. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530.
72. However, as the U.S. Supreme Court recently made clear, the role of the appellate
court is not identical to, but is rather narrower than, that of a trial court confronted with a
qualified immunity summary judgment motion. The Court unanimously held in Johnson v.
Jones, 115 S. Ct. 2151 (1995), that where § 1983 defendants move for summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds, and the district court denies their motion because there are no
material issues of fact in dispute, the defendants are not entitled to interlocutory review of this
decision under Mitchell v. Forsyth. Specifically, the Court ruled that defendants cannot immedi-




When all of these substantive and procedural doctrinal changes
are assessed from the perspective of narrative and empathy, it be-
comes clear that the U.S. Supreme Court has engineered a deep, al-
beit subtle, change in the § 1983 landscape. It has restructured
narrative and empathy in a way that privileges the defendant's narra-
tive and marginalizes that of the plaintiff. This effectively instructs the
decision-maker, the judge (and not the jury), to empathize with the
defendant, which in turn encourages the judge to be merciful to the
defendant especially in close cases.
Whether this restructuring of narrative and empathy was deliber-
ate is difficult to say. However, it complements parallel changes in the
nature of the discourse used by the Court in § 1983 litigation, changes
which have the effect of making it easier for courts to rule against
§ 1983 plaintiffs. 73 These changes are consistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court's overt pro-defendant doctrinal moves in § 1983 litiga-
tion, which are designed to minimize the potential damages liability of
government officials, thus forcing § 1983 plaintiffs to bear their own
losses even when their constitutional rights are violated.
73. As I have previously argued. See Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move
from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719 (1989).
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